These and many other differences make it difficult to compare existing results, and plausibly also reflect the more general problem that decision scenarios vary between laboratories, let alone in the field 53. The decision paradigms employed in previous studies also varied in other potentially important aspects: from specific payoff parameters 49, to nuances of the instructions 50, “details” that are now known to affect decisions 51, 52, and that could plausibly interact with the effects of induced emotions. As briefly described above, even in non social decision making, induced fear can lead to aversion to risk and uncertainty 18 and it is therefore unsurprising that this may carry over to social decisions in which uncertainty is salient 47. For instance, some studies focused on cooperative decisions that involved uncertainty of reciprocation (e.g., trusting others) 39, 45, 47, while other studies did not (e.g., when deciding to give to others with no possibility of reciprocation) 40, 41, 42, 45, 46, 48. One possible source for the inconsistency of these results could be that these studies focused on different decision paradigms, which varied in important characteristics. Problematically, the empirical literature remains mixed in this regard, as manipulations of fear, or fear-associated stress, have been associated with both increased cooperative behaviors 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44 and decreased cooperative behaviors 45, 46, 47. On the other hand, fear has also been linked with a motive to seek protection and safety 13, 15, 36, 37, potentially leading subjects to engage in cooperative behaviors as a mean to seek protection in others 38. In this case, induced fear could lead individuals away from cooperation. On the one hand, cooperation frequently involves real or perceived “risks”, such as the risk of being socially excluded or the risk that one’s cooperation will not reciprocated. In particular, while induced anger has been associated with decreased cooperation 28, 29, 30 and increased punishments 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, it remains unclear how fear may be related to cooperative decisions. However, it is unclear how this may extend to social decisions, such as those related to cooperation and punishment 27. In line with this, both inter-individual differences in disposition to experience fear and anger 18, 19, 20, as well as experimental inductions of fear and anger 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, have been shown to oppositely affect judgment and decision making, with fear contributing to avoidance, and anger to approach of risk in non social decisions. We address this by assessing how experimental inductions of fear (threat-avoidance motives) and anger (threat-approach motives) affect these decisions in individuals with differing social value orientation.Ī long-standing view contends that fear and anger arise from a common underlying threat system 12, with fear promoting the avoidance of threats 13, 14, 15, and anger their approach 16, 17. Here, we ask how individual differences in social value orientation modulate decisions to cooperate and punish when individuals feel threatened. Much harder to reconcile with economic theory are ‘incidental’ or induced emotions and motives, which have been shown to affect decisions even if they are unrelated to them 9, 10, 11. Similarly, economists have developed theories of social preferences, conceived as stable inter-individual differences in preferences for certain type of goals 6, 7, 8. individualistic value orientation) can influence such social decisions across time and contexts 4, 5. To account for this, psychologists 2, 3 have demonstrated that stable inter-individual differences in social value orientation (such as prosocial vs.
Humans across cultures are known to frequently incur costs to benefit or punish others 1.
0 kommentar(er)
